In this paper, we exploit the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in 23 states to identify a causal impact of shareholder protection laws on the implied cost of capital. Using public firms in the U.S. over 1985 -2007, we find that weakened shareholder litigation rights induced by the UD laws lead to an increase in firms' cost of capital. Further tests suggest that these heightened financing costs result from the increase in agency costs that arise when shareholder protections are curtailed. The impact of UD laws is more profound among more M&A-intensive industries but is attenuated among firms with a significant presence of institutional block holders. In addition, we find that the quality of financial reporting deteriorates following the passage of UD laws, suggesting that part of the increased agency costs stem from the obfuscation of financial statements. Overall, our findings support the notion that UD laws place significant obstacles to shareholder lawsuits, leading shareholders to face greater agency conflicts, which ultimately translates into higher required returns.
Introduction
A pivotal implication from the literature on law and finance is that laws protecting shareholder interests help resolve the agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control (La Porta et al., 2000b) . These protections increase investors' willingness to finance firms, and ultimately boost financial market development and corporation valuations in the equity market (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 . Prior research highlights that the legal protection of outside investors helps boost corporate valuation, either because investors are better protected from being expropriated by insiders and/or because the accessibility to external finance enable firms to fully exploit their growth opportunities.
In this paper, we consider an alternative channel in which shareholder protection laws may influence corporate valuations. We focus on how changes in the litigation environment affect shareholders' required risk premia, which generates important influences on both corporate valuations and the overall depth of financial markets.
1 Specifically, when outside shareholders invest in jurisdictions with stronger investor protections, they recognize that insiders are less likely to divert firm resources for their own private benefits. Shareholders 1 A related paper by Hail and Leuz (2006) examines whether international differences in the cost of equity capital can be explained by securities regulation. Conducting cross-country analyses, Hail and Leuz (2006) document more stringent securities regulation reduces the cost of equity capital. Our study, however, distinguishes from theirs in at least the following two ways. First, we focus on a particular aspect of shareholder rights: private litigation right, whereas Hail and Leuz (2006) focus on indices with an emphasis of disclosure requirement for new equity issuance. Second, our empirical design exploits shifts of legal environment across states over time due to the staggered adoption of the law, rather than depending on cross-country variations of legal institutions.
factoring this lower risk of expropriation into their valuation model, are therefore willing to pay more for firms' equity, which in turn enables firms to obtain external financing with better terms.
As argued in La Porta et al. (2006, P28) , "the benefit of common law in this area comes from its emphasis on market discipline and private litigation". In particular, they find that the procedural easiness in which securities laws facilitate the recovery of investors' damages plays an effective role in promoting financial market development. Also, La Porta et al. (1997 suggest that among different aspects of shareholder rights coded by company law or commercial code, "perhaps most importantly", is litigation rights that provide minority shareholders legal mechanisms against potentially oppressive director. In light of their particular emphasis on the important role of private litigation, we assess how shareholders' ability to make legal claims against corporate management affects firms' cost of capital.
To isolate the effects of shareholder litigation rights, we employ a quasi-natural experiment where we examine the impact of state-level changes in universal demand (UD) laws, which have arguably shifted the allocation of risk from firms to shareholders. To the extent that these shifts are significant, we test whether these changes in UD law have led to an increase in firms' cost of capital.
Since the late 1980s, 23 states in the U.S. have adopted these universal demand laws. The adoption of UD laws has arguably weakened shareholders' litigation rights by raising procedural hurdles to pursue derivative lawsuits (Appel, 2014) . 2 Specifically, if a firm's manager breaches fiduciary duties by causing injuries to the firm, individual shareholders are entitled to bring a derivative suit against the manager to remedy wrongdoings on behalf of the corporation. The universal demand laws, however, impose a "universal demand requirement" to almost every derivative lawsuit, meaning that the plaintiff shareholder must first make a demand on the board of directors to take corrective actions before initiating a lawsuit. This "demand requirement"
places a significant obstacle to derivate suits because directors almost always refuse to proceed with litigation, and the shareholder can no longer argue demand futility on the grounds that directors have a conflict of interests (Appel, 2014) . In this way, UD laws impede shareholder protection by making it more difficult for shareholders to seek remedies and enforce fiduciary duties through derivative suits. 3 Methodologically, the staggered adoption of UD laws on a state level over time allows us to employ a difference-in-differences approach. Compared to conventional cross-country analyses, this empirical design has at least two advantages to further alleviate concerns related to omitted factors. The diff-in-diff approach allows us to control for firm and year fixed effects throughout our analyses. Firm fixed effects account for unobserved, time-invariant characteristics across firms, and year dummies account for the time trend. In our subsequent robustness tests, we conduct the analyses in a more rigorous way by adding industry-year and state-of-location-year fixed effects. In particular, industry-year fixed effects control for unobserved, time-varying heterogeneity across industries (such as specific industrial shock), and state-of-location-year fixed effects control for unobserved, time-varying differences across states of locations (such as local economic conditions). 4 At the same time, reverse causality is less of a concern in our setting, since the passage of these laws occurs at the state-of-incorporation level, and hence they are unlikely to be associated with individual firm characteristics.
Our sample consists of 4,600 public firms in the U.S. over 1985 -2007. For each firm, we apply an accounting-based discounted dividend valuation model to estimate its annual cost of capital. Following Hail and Leuz (2006 Leuz ( , 2009 , we employ four different models, and back out the cost of capital estimate as the implied rate of return that equates the stock price and the present value of future earnings. 5 Based on these estimates, our baseline analyses suggest that 3 Note that such private litigation mechanism might be particularly meaningful to minority shareholders, since large shareholders have alternative ways to exert governance and vindicate their interests, such as voting rights (voice) and selling threats (exit). Also, derivative lawsuits are believed to have deterrence value even if managers' personal liabilities are insured by Director & Officer (D&O) insurance, indemnification contracts, etc. (Ferris et al., 2007) . Consistently, Prior studies document a governance effect of shareholder lawsuits (Ferris et al., 2007; Appel, 2014) . 4 We are able to control for time-varying differences across states of locations because a considerable proportion of firms in our sample are not incorporated in their states of location. 5 The four particular models are described in details in the Appendix. See Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) , Easton (2004) , and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) .
following the passage of UD laws, the implied cost of capital (ICOC) for firms incorporated in the state rises on average by 33 basis points, an increase of 7% of the sample median. Consistent with our conjecture, the positive association between UD laws and firms' cost of capital implies that the law shifts risk to shareholders in a meaningful way. In particular, the law imposes greater barriers to derivative suits, hence reducing the threat of litigation and stifling its deterrence value.
Recognizing that they carry greater risk due to dampened litigation rights, shareholders demand a higher rate of return, which translates into an increase in firms' cost of capital. Moreover, the shift in the litigation environment intensifies agency conflicts and encourages firms' management to take on riskier projects which expose shareholders to larger agency costs and lead to further increases in the cost of capital. Our dynamic analyses provide evidence in support of this conjecture. Increases in firms' financing cost continue to manifest two years after the UD law becomes effective, suggesting that the law has a long-term impact on corporate's cost of capital.
We conduct a series of empirical tests to alleviate endogeneity concerns related to reverse causality and omitted factors. First, we find no evidence that increases of individual firms' cost of capital reversely trigger the adoption of UD laws on state level. Second, we demonstrate that pre-trends in the cost of capital fail to explain our main findings. Furthermore, our results remain robust when we account for time-invariant firm characteristics, as well as time-varying heterogeneity across industries and across states of location. Hence, shocks to specific industries or shifts on local economic conditions do not account for the impact of UD laws.
Our main results are insensitive to changes in the sample composition. In particular, the UD law is shown to increase the cost of capital if we use a sample that (1) removes the firms incorporated in Delaware, (2) excludes the internet bubble period of 2000 -2001, (3) extends the sample period until 2013, and (4) restricts the analysis to the 23 states that have adopted the UD law over the sample period.
Weakened shareholder litigation rights increase the cost of corporate financing by aggravating agency problems which lead to a rise of agency costs. As implied in previous studies (Ferris et al., 2007; Appel, 2014) , better corporate governance mechanisms are imposed following shareholder litigation, and when shareholder litigation rights are stifled, corporate governance deteriorates. Given these existing evidence, we explicitly control for a battery of corporate governance measures. Specifically, we consider shifts in the market for corporate control induced by antitakeover laws on the state level (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) , firmlevel antitakeover provisions (Gompers et al., 2003) , and industrial competition (HerfindahlHirschman index). Our main findings are shown to remain qualitatively robust to these additional controls, indicating that the positive links between UD laws and the cost of capital are not a simple manifestation of deteriorated governance quality. Put differently, shareholder litigation rights have additional influence beyond their impact on corporate governance.
Building on our basic findings, we further employ a triple term (DDD) analyses to provide additional evidence that the adoption of UD laws increases firms' cost of capital through intensifying agency conflicts resulted from a reduction of shareholder litigation rights, not through some other mechanisms. To investigate the agency channel, we show that the effects of UD laws on our implied cost of capital estimates have cross-sectional variations in a theoretically predictable pattern. Specifically, if the law increases the cost of capital via restraining derivative suits and hence dampening shareholders disciplining role, then the impact of UD laws on the cost of capital should be more pronounced among firms with more severe agency conflicts. With these concerns in mind, we construct two measures to proxy for the extent of agency conflicts.
First, given that active acquisitions create opportunities of corporate insiders to expropriate outside investors, we measure industrial M&A intensity as a particular manifestation of agency problems (Harford et al., 2012) . Second, we define a dummy variable that indicates whether the total ownership by institutional blockholders (institutional investors who hold more than 5% of the shares) exceeds 30% of the company shares, since large institutional investors play a monitoring role that mitigates agency problems. 6 The heterogeneous effects of UD laws are shown to be consistent with the agency channel: the law has a more pronounced impact on the implied cost of capital among greater M&A-intensive industries, and a less pronounced effect among firms highly held by institutional blockholders.
Finally, we conduct analyses to explore an additional channel underlying our main findings. Previous studies imply that self-interested managers have the incentive to obfuscate their financial statement and mask their expropriation behavior. Through affecting managerial incentive, legal environment can influence the financial reporting quality (e.g., Barzuza and Smith, 2014; Leuz et al., 2003) . Following the passage of the UD laws, managers are better insulated from shareholder litigations, which discourages them from maintaining a transparent information environment. When investors face greater information uncertainty due to deteriorated financial reporting quality, they tend to require a higher rate of return to compensate for the ex-ante information risk, hence leading to higher firms' cost of capital. We find evidence supporting this channel. The UD laws are shown to result in increases in the absolute value of discretionary accruals, indicating lower quality of financial reporting and disclosure.
We build our paper on an extensive strand of studies that highlight the role of investor protection on a variety of financial and accounting outcomes (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 , 2000a Leuz et al., 2003; Hail and Leuz, 2006) . Many researchers stress that investor protection laws boost firms' equity value because they increase firms' accessibility to external finance for value-enhancing projects and thus enable firms' to better exploit growth opportunities (La Porta et al., 2002) . Our study complements this line of works by documenting the risk premium mechanism through which legal systems affect corporate equity valuations.
Methodologically, while researchers in this area mostly rely on cross-country variations on legal institutions, we follow Appel (2014) and exploit the shifts of shareholder protection pertaining to litigation rights across different states over time due to the staggered adoption of UD laws. Such quasi-natural experiment setting helps further alleviate omitted variable concerns, and thus allows us to establish a causal link between shareholder protection and the cost of capital. This is a major difference between this paper and Hail and Leuz (2006) that rely on cross-country variations in legal protection. Moreover, while Hail and Leuz (2006) show that country-level differences in legal systems affect the cost of capital in an international setting, our results suggest that even within the U.S. with strong shareholder protection laws, state-level variations in shareholder litigation rights via derivative lawsuits still matter for firms' cost of capital.
Broadly speaking, we also contribute to the litigation risk literature which focuses primarily on class action lawsuits (DuCharme et al., 2004; Hanley and Hoberg, 2012; Lowry and Shu, 2002; Skinner, 1997) .
Our work also relates to research on the determinants of the implied cost of capital. The accounting-based implied cost of capital measure has been accepted and widely used in not only accounting studies, but also finance literature (e.g., Li et al., 2013 ). Since we argue that weakened shareholder litigation rights increase the cost of capital by intensifying agency conflicts, this paper contributes to studies on the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of capital (Chen et al., 2011) . In addition, this paper also relates to Chen et al. (2015) , who show that directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) increases the cost of capital by reducing the deterrence effects of shareholder litigation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data including the sample and variable construction, and introduces the empirical design. Section 3 presents and discusses our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Primary sample
We obtain financial data from Compustat, analyst forecasts information from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), and stock price information from the Center for 
Universal Demand (UD) laws
Corporate officers and directors have a fiduciary responsibility to take actions that are consistent with maximizing long-run shareholder value. However, it is well recognized that the separation of ownership and control often induces managers to take actions that serve their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. When such wrongdoing is detected, shareholders may take legal actions as a means of protecting their rights and interests.
Shareholders may assert their rights through both derivative and direct lawsuits. The major differences between these two lie in the specific injured party and the subsequent financial recovery (e.g., Ferris et al., 2007; Appel, 2014 One significant procedural barrier to derivative suits is known as the "demand requirement". Specifically, before a derivative suit can be brought, the plaintiff shareholder must first demand that the corporate's board of directors take corrective actions to address the alleged wrongdoings. The board's response to the claim determines whether shareholders can proceed with litigation. Such a demand, however, involves an inherent conflict of interest, since some board members are often named as defendants. In practice, the directors almost always reject the demand to proceed with litigation (Swanson, 1993) . The law makes exception to the demand requirement: the shareholder is entitled to argue "demand futility" if they demonstrate that the board of directors cannot evaluate the demand impartially. After the demand requirement is ruled futile, the shareholder may circumvent the board and initiate a demand-excused suit.
Since the 1980s, various states have adopted universal demand requirements, whereby a shareholder must make a demand on the board of directors prior to every suit. The adoption of the universal demand requirement makes it significantly more difficult for shareholders to proceed with derivative suits. Our key explanatory variable in this study is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is incorporated in a state with effective Universal Demand (UD) laws. 
Estimating the cost of capital
In our analysis, we utilize a series of accounting-based valuation models approach to estimate the firms' ex ante cost of capital. This approach has two main benefits relative to alternative techniques that rely on realized stock returns as proxies for the cost of capital. First, the accounting-based valuation models separately incorporate cash flow estimates, which make them particularly suited for isolating changes in the cost of capital. Second, since they do not rely on realized stock returns, these approaches are able to produce cost of capital estimates, without having to utilize a long time-series of past returns (Hail and Leuz, 2009) . forecasted earnings, the explicit forecast horizon, and the assumptions regarding short-term and long-term growth rates. We use median values of analyst forecasts throughout the estimation. In Appendix Table A1 , we provide detailed descriptions of each of the four models.
Each estimate of ICOC is constrained to be positive -so if a negative value is obtained, we treat the observation as missing. From each of the resulting estimates, we subtract the riskfree rate (measured as the yield to maturity on 10-year Treasury securities) in order to obtain an estimate of the risk premium. Finally, to reduce the potential measurement error introduced by individual models, we follow prior studies (e.g., Hail and Leuz, 2009) , and take either the average ( ) or the first principal component ( ) of the four risk premium estimates for each firm-year observation, conditional on having available values for all four individual ICOC measures. To prevent our results from being driven by outliers, we winsorize all firm-level variables at 1% and 99% levels. Summary statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that there is a fair degree of variations in the aggregate ICOC estimates. The average of the four individual ICOC measures net of the risk-free rate, R AVG _R f , ranges from 0.2% to 16% with a mean of 5.5%
and a median of 4.9%. Our summary statistics have similar magnitude compared to those reported in Hail and Leuz (2006) using the same estimation method. More specifically, the average cost of capital in the U.S. is reported to equal 10.24% (See Table 1 in Hail and Leuz (2006)), which implies an average risk premium of 4.24% assuming a 6% risk free rate.
Other firm-level attributes
In order to isolate the impact of UD laws on firms' cost of capital, we consider several firm-level controls that are documented to be correlated with equity returns (Botosan et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2015) . In particular, we control for firm Size, Leverage, and the book-to-market-ratio (BM). Size equals the natural logarithm of market value; Leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to the market value of equity; and BM is the book-to-market ratio and equals the natural logarithm of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. All three variables are measured at the beginning of a fiscal year relative to the dependent variable. We also take into account two proxies for risk, systematic risk (Beta) and idiosyncratic risk (IdiosRisk). Both are estimated by the market model using daily returns over the 12 month prior to the time of ICOC estimation.
We also consider two additional controls, LnRet12 and FBIAS to account for the potential sluggishness and bias of analyst forecasts (Easton and Sommers, 2007; Guay et al., 2011) . Arguably, analysts may not always incorporate new information as quickly as the stock market. Consequently, their failure to revise their forecasts in a timely manner creates circumstances where the reported forecast is a biased estimate of the firm's future cash flows, which in turn generates a bias in the cost of capital measures. In light of this issue, we follow Guay et al. (2011), and calculate the price run-up (LnRet12) using the previous 12-month daily returns to capture analysts' sluggishness in processing information. From a different perspective, analyst forecasts are known to be optimistic (Easton and Sommers, 2007) . If market participants recognize this bias and systematically adjust stock price accordingly, then the implied cost of capital estimated from the accounting-based valuation models will be consistently upward biased.
To control for this bias, we construct FBIAS, which is defined as the one-year-ahead actual realized earnings minus the one-year-ahead analysts' forecasted earnings, scaled by the stock price one-month earlier than the forecast announcement date. Note that FBIAS is constructed in a way that a lower value indicates a more optimistic forecast. We describe detailed variable definitions in Appendix Table A2 , and report summary statistics for all the control variables in Table 2. 13
Empirical methodology
We use the staggered adoption of UD laws across different states to assess the impact of derivative lawsuits on the cost of capital. The baseline difference-in-differences specification is as follows: 
Empirical Results
Timing of adopting UD laws
The nature of our empirical design limits the usual concerns related to reverse causality.
First, it seems unlikely that individual firms' financing costs would triggers shifts in state-level UD laws. Moreover, even if firms lobby for the adoption of the UD laws so that they could enjoy cheaper financing, these actions would work against us finding that the passage of UD laws leads to an increase in the firm's cost of capital. Nevertheless, we do conduct some validity tests to more formally address the possibility of reverse causality. (2) where the dependent variable is the log of expected time to passing a UD law, and the explanatory variable corresponds to the contemporaneous cost of capital aggregated at the state level. As shown in Table 3 , the statelevel cost of capital does not enter significantly in any specifications, indicating that neither the probability nor the timing of adopting a UD law is driven by the individual firms' cost of capital.
UD laws and cost of capital 3.2.1 Baseline analyses
Both anecdotal evidence and the regression tests in Appel (2014) suggest that UD laws make it considerably more difficult for shareholders to proceed with derivative lawsuits. By limiting their ability to effectively litigate against corporate actions that destroy firm value, these laws subject shareholders to greater risk, which may ultimately lead them to require higher rates of return in jurisdictions with UD laws. Accordingly, we exploit the adoption of UD laws as a quasi-natural experiment to assess how laws weakening shareholder protection affect firms' cost of capital. Consequently, we start by examining the UD laws' impact on the affected firms' implied cost of capital measures. Table 4 is consistent with the hypothesis that a decline in derivative lawsuits resulting from the passage of UD laws induces investors to require a higher rate of return. Coefficients on the UD Law dummy capture the difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) treatment effects. All diff-in-diff estimates enter positively and significantly across the seven columns in Table 4, suggesting that passing a UD law will lead to an increase in the implied cost of capital.
Specifically, in column (1) we take the average of four individual measures of ICOC, R AVG _R f , as the dependent variable, and the UD Law indicator together with firm and year fixed effects as the explanatory variables. The cost-increasing effects remain qualitatively robust to alternative ICOC measures, the log of the risk premium measure, Ln(R AVG _R f ), and the first principal component, R FPC _R f , in columns (2) and (3), respectively. In each case, the coefficients on UD Law enter positively and significantly, indicating that passing a UD law results in an increase in the cost of capital. Columns (4) -(6) correspond to analyses with additional firm-level controls for Size, Leverage, BM, Beta, IdiosRisk, LnRet12, and FBIAS. After controlling for these additional factors, we continue to find the UD Law indicator to be statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) in the models using the various ICOC measures.
The economic magnitude of these findings is quite meaningful. The diff-in-diff coefficient from column (4) implies that following the adoption of a UD law, the cost of capital for firms incorporated in the state will increase on average by 33 basis points, which is equivalent to 7% of the median value of R AVG _R f (49 basis points as reported in Table 2 ). A similar finding is confirmed in column (5) where we use the natural logarithm of ICOC measure as the dependent variable: here once again, the UD law is estimated to increase the cost of equity capital by about 7%.
Following Hail and Leuz (2009), we report the weighted OLS regression in column (7) using R AVG _R f as the dependent variable, and employing analyst forecast accuracy as the weight.
As our proxies for ICOC are calculated from analyst earnings forecasts, the weighted OLS regression model gives higher weights to more accurate forecasts. In particular, analyst forecast accuracy is constructed as the inverse of the absolute one-year-ahead forecast error scaled by the stock price one month earlier than the forecast date. Column (7) shows that the effects of UD Law on our primary ICOC measure are insensitive to this alternative specification. The coefficient estimate on UD Law indicates an average effect of 31 basis points, and remains statistically significant at the 1% level. In sum, the results in Table 4 are consistent with our conjecture that UD laws reducing the possibility of shareholder litigations result in dramatic increases in the affected firms' cost of capital.
Taking a closer look at the results, we also see that the control variables have the expected effects. The cost of capital is negatively associated with firm size, while firms with higher leverage ratios and return volatility bear higher financing costs. The negative coefficient on LnRet12 is also consistent with our expectations. In particular, these results imply that following a large stock price run-up (decline), if analysts fail to revise their earnings forecasts quickly enough to incorporate the new information, then our ICOC estimates will be biased downward (upward). As mentioned in Section 2.4, a lower value of analyst forecast bias, FBIAS, implies a more optimistic forecast. Thus the negative coefficients on FBIAS from Table 4 suggest that greater optimism leads to higher estimates of the cost of capital. Coefficients on these controls variables are consistent with the results found in previous empirical studies (e.g.,
Hail and Leuz, 2006; 2009; Chen et al., 2015) .
Dynamic effects
We next examine how the firms' cost of capital estimates evolves over the years surrounding the passage of the UD laws. Specifically, we allow the effects of UD laws to vary over time by including a series of dummies indicating the sequential years relative the passing year. This exercise enables us to observe (1) whether the increase in ICOC precedes the time of adoption, and (2) when the UD laws take effects in the years following passage. The dynamic difference-in-differences specification is as follows:
where the dependent variable, firm and year fixed effects, and firm controls have the same denotation as in Equation (1). , captures the dynamic effect, and equals one for state s in the jth year relative to the year of adoption, and zero otherwise.
, − is an indicator corresponding to one year before the UD law passage. Adding this pre-passage dummy into the model serves as a falsification test for identification (Appel, 2014) . If the change in financing costs is indeed attributable to changes in UD laws, then we should observe a significant effect after (but not before) the law becomes effective. Table 5 shows that UD laws have a profound impact on the cost of capital during the year of implementation and two years after, but there is no systematic change in the period before implementation. As reported, the coefficients on UD Law -1 are trivial and statistically insignificant across columns, implying that there is no significant change in the ICOC before the UD laws are implemented. In contrast, the coefficients on UD Law 0 and UD Law 2+ are both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the passage of UD laws quickly has a material impact on firms' cost of capital, and this impact remains in place two years later. This pattern holds when we use alternative ICOC measures or regression models.
Sensitivity tests
In this section, we conduct several additional robustness checks by either adding more controls or altering the sample composition. First, we control for state-of-location-by-year and industry-by-year fixed effects to account for additional omitted variables. Next, we consider a potential confounding event, the staggered adoption of antitakeover laws since the 1980s.
Previous studies show that the passage of antitakeover laws affects the firms' overall corporate governance, which in turn leads to changes in various firm policies and business decisions. In addition, we consider two measures of corporate governance, G-index and HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI), to check whether shareholder litigation still plays an independent role, after explicitly controlling for these measures. Finally, we examine whether our main results are susceptible to sample composition. Table 6 shows that the impact of UD laws on ICOC is robust to more stringent controls.
To further mitigate concerns related to omitted variable bias, columns (1) -(3) employ more restrictive specifications that include state-of-location-by-year or/and two-digit SIC industry-byyear to account for unobservable time-varying heterogeneity across states of headquarters and across industry, respectively. We are able to add state-of-location-year fixed effects because more than 65% of the sample firms incorporate in states different from their location. As reported, the coefficients on the UD Law indicator remain statistically significant at the 5% level.
At the same time, the economic magnitude of the results falls by about 18-40% due to the inclusion of these additional fixed effects.
A potential confounding event took place in the 1980s, when 36 states started to adopt at least one of three antitakeover laws: business combination (BC) laws, fair price (FP) laws, and control share acquisition (CSA) laws. These laws arguably dampen the governance role provided by the market for corporate control, by insulating managers from the threat of hostile takeovers (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) . Likewise, these antitakeover laws might affect our results if governance plays a role in determining a firm's cost of capital. To alleviate this concern, we explicitly control for antitakeover laws in our specification by constructing three indicators corresponding to each law. For example, BC Law equals one when firms incorporate in states that passed business combination laws, and is otherwise zero. The same definition applies to FP Law and CSA Law. The horse race tests between the universal demand laws and antitakeover laws as in columns (4) - (6) Column (7) of Table 6 reports the horse race test between the shareholder litigation and corporate governance effects. Importantly, our main results are barely affected by these two additional controls: the universal demand law is still shown to have a significant impact on firms' cost of capital, as suggested by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on UD Law in column (7). Interestingly, G-index and HHI are both estimated to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels, implying that weaker governance is associated with a higher cost of capital.
The results presented in Table 7 suggest that our main findings are robust to shifts in sample composition. For ease of comparison, column (1) repeats the same baseline analysis as in Table 4 column (4). One possible concern is that more than half of the sample firms are incorporated in Delaware. To insure that our results are not driven by a single state, we re-run the baseline model using a sample that excludes Delaware. These results, reported in column (3), confirm that our main findings are upheld. In a similar fashion, column (3) 
Heterogeneous effects of UD laws
In this section, we extend our analyses by exploring whether the effects of universal demand laws on corporate's cost of capital vary across certain types of firms and industries.
These extensions are helpful for identifying the underlying channels through which UD laws affect ICOC. Methodologically, we assess the heterogeneous effects of UD laws by interacting the UD Law indictor with a conditional variable. Specifically, we employ the following regression model. 
where the dependent variable and explanatory variables have the same denotation as in Equation
(1). Building on our baseline model, we now interact the UD Law with a conditional variable, , , , , for firm i of industry j, in state s at time t. The coefficient, , captures the heterogeneous impact of universal demand laws. In our analysis, we consider two possible conditional variables which capture the intensity of M&A deals in an industry, and large holdings by institutional blockholders. The corresponding results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.
As shown in Moeller et al. (2004) , the equally-weighted average return for acquirers in the U.S. market is only 1%, while shareholders in acquiring firms on average lose 25.2 million dollars, suggesting that acquisitions are value-destroying on average. This result is consistent with the notion that self-interested managers tend to undertake M&A activities to seek expropriations (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999) . For instance, managers can benefit directly after an acquisition by negotiating a better package for running a larger firm (also known as the empire-building purpose), and they also gain personal reputations from a large deal. Hence more intensive M&A activities indicate greater agency conflicts. We construct industrial M&A intensity using data from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions.
Specifically, for each industry-year, we compute the total dollar amount of M&A deals for firms with the same two-digit SIC code, scaled by the total book value of assets or market capitalization of all public firms in the same industry covered by Compustat. A greater value of the ratio indicates a more M&A-intensive industry.
To the extent that UD laws weaken shareholder litigation rights, then we expect the effects of their passage to be more profound among firms with more severe agency problems.
We use acquisition intensity to measure the extent of agency problems since M&A deals are often value-decreasing and thus considered as investment decisions that may serve managerial private benefits to the detriment of shareholders (Harford, 2012) . Consequently, firms that (incline to) undertake value-destroying acquisitions are more likely to face derivative lawsuits, and those would be more directly influenced by the passage of UD laws. shareholders. Consequently, investors in these firms are expected to be less affected by the adoption of UD laws. In sum, the empirical evidence in this section is consistent with our hypotheses that the universal demand laws influence corporate financing cost by weakening the litigation mechanism, which in turn intensifies agency conflicts. As litigation serves as an important tool for shareholders to seek legal protection and indemnification when they find themselves being expropriated, weakened litigation should have more profound effects for firms with greater agency problems. This conjecture is confirmed in Tables 8 and 9 : the impact of UD laws on ICOC is shown to be stronger among more M&A-intensive industries, and weaker for firms that are closely monitored by institutional block holders.
Channel: Financial reporting quality
Increases in agency costs imposed by the UD laws may partly stem from the deterioration of financial reporting and disclosure. To shed light on this potential channel, we conduct a final set of analyses exploring whether the passage of universal demand laws directly influences the quality of firm disclosures. Previous studies have demonstrated that changes in the legal environment often influence firm's financial reporting and disclosure quality (Barzuza and Smith, 2014; Leuz et al., 2003) . In the context of UD laws, one could argue that managers who are now more immune from derivative suits, are freer to disclose more information because they are less likely to be sued for making misleading statements. Alternatively, a lower likelihood of bearing legal consequences can create incentives for the managers to pursue their private agenda and obfuscate financial statements for their own private benefits. Deteriorated reporting quality in turn makes existing shareholders or potential capital providers to face higher information uncertainty ex ante, leading them to require a higher rate of return. To the extent this hypothesis is supported, this argument suggests an information channel in which the passage of UD laws leads to a higher cost of capital.
With these issues in mind, we examine whether the quality of financial reporting falls after the passage of universal demand laws. The regression model we employ is as follows.
where the dependent variable, , , , is the measure of financial reporting quality in firm i, incorporated in state s, at year t. We follow the previous literature and use discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings quality. We adopt three estimation models that are commonly used in the literature (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 2010; Kothari et al., 2005) . All three models attempt to explain the amount of total accruals with operating items.
Based on accounting principal, the main components of accruals, changes in working capital and depreciations, are supposed to be correlated with changes in revenues and investment in fixed assets, respectively. The unexplained component, captured by the residual term, , , , is taken as the discretionary accruals. We take the absolute value of each residual, so that a higher value of discretionary accruals suggests more earnings management. We describe each model in more detail in Appendix Table A2 . and EBITDA. Similar to Equation (1), we control for firm and year fixed effects, α and , to account for unobservable firm heterogeneity and time trend.
Table 10 provides evidence that earnings management becomes more severe following the adoption of UD laws. Column (1) shows that the UD Law enters the regression positively and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that the quality of financial reporting tends to deteriorate when managers are exposed to less threat of shareholder litigations due to the adoption of UD laws. Economically, passing a UD law results in an increase in discretionary accruals by 0.5 percentage points. This is equivalent to about 8% of the standard deviation of the discretionary accruals using Jone's model, DAccrual_Jones's. As reported in columns (2) and (3), the results are robust to using other two models for computing discretionary accruals.
Conclusion
Does the legal environment and the level of shareholder protection meaningfully influence the cost of capital? To shed some light on this broader issue, we exploit the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in 23 states to examine the causal impact of shareholder litigation rights on the implied cost of capital. We build upon previous research (Appel, 2014) , which has shown that UD laws weaken shareholder litigation rights by placing a significant obstacle to derivative lawsuits.
Employing a difference-in-differences approach on a sample of U.S. public firms from 1985 through 2007, we find that reduced shareholder litigation rights induced by UD laws increase firms cost of capital. Proxies for implied cost of capital are estimated from four accounting-based valuation models commonly used in the previous literature. Our baseline results are robust to the inclusion of firm, year, industry-year, and state-of-location-year fixed effects, and corporate governance controls. They are also not sensitive to alternative dependent variables or changes in sample composition.
Further analyses on the heterogeneous effects suggest that shareholder litigation rights influence corporate financing through the aggravation of agency problems, which increases the agency costs exposed to the shareholders. Consistent with this conjecture, the impact of UD laws is shown to be more profound among more M&A-intensive industries, but they are less relevant for firms where institutional blockholders have a significant presence. Finally, we also find that the quality of financial statements, captured by earnings management, deteriorates following the passage of UD laws. This evidence suggests that part of the agency costs stem from the deterioration of financial reporting. Overall, our findings support the notion that UD laws place significant obstacles to shareholder lawsuits, leading shareholders to face greater agency costs which in turn lead them to require a higher rate of return.
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Appendix
Table A1 Descriptions of individual implied cost of capital (ICOC) estimates
This table describes in detail the four individual models used to estimate the implied cost of capital (ICOC). We obtain firm-level financial data from Compustat, analyst forecasts on earnings per share and long-term growth rate from I/B/E/S, and stock price information from CRSP. To estimate the implied cost of capital from the four models described above, each firm-year observation needs to have available information on book value of equity per share ( ) and dividend payout ratio ( ). Moreover, we require nonnegative one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts (̂+ 1 and ̂+ 2 ), a long-term growth forecast ( ), and a contemporaneous share price ( ). We employ the median analyst consensus forecasts in I/B/E/S and contemporaneous stock price in CRSP as of June each year. This time lag is chosen to ensure that the financial information on the previous fiscal year is already publicly available and gets reflected in the market price at the time of estimation. CT and OJ valuation models include risk-free rate, , as an additional input, which corresponds to yield on 10-year Treasury securities collected from the U.S. Federal Reserve System.
For the residual income valuation models that do not have a closed form solution (CT and GLS), we use an iterative algorithm to approximate the internal rate of return, while for the abnormal earnings growth valuation models that have an analytical solution (OJ and MPEG), we substitute the inputs into the solution to calculate the value of ICOC. We constrain each proxy for ICOC to be positive and economic meaningful. We further subtract risk-free rate from the individual proxies to obtain risk premium. Finally, to reduce the measurement error introduced by individual models, we follow prior studies and take either the average ( ) or the first principal component ( ) of the four estimates for each observation, conditional on available values of all four individual ICOC measures. We report the empirical results mainly on these two aggregate measures. Claus and Thomas (2001) where the equation has an explicit five-year forecast horizon, denotes the implied cost of capital estimates that solve CT's residual income valuation equation, is the market price of a firm's stock at time , and (̂+ − • + −1 ) is the residual income in year + (or for period ( + − 1, + ) ), defined as the difference between forecasted earnings and a cost of capital charged for the book value of equity at the beginning of a fiscal year. ̂+ is the expected future earnings per share for period ( + − 1, + ). The expected future earnings, ̂+ 1 … ̂+ 5 , are derived from analyst forecasts. We collect median analyst forecasts on one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings as ̂+ 1 and ̂+ 2 , respectively. Explicit three-, four-, and five-year-ahead forecasts are often unavailable, and are calculated by projecting the forecasted long-term growth rate, , on the previous year's earnings forecast: ̂+ =̂+ −1 • (1 + ). is the book value of equity per share at the beginning of the fiscal period . + is the expected future book value per share at time + , and is determined by clean surplus accounting: + = + −1 +̂+ • (1 − ), where represents the dividend payout ratio and equals to the actual dividends from the most recent fiscal year divided by earnings over the same period if the earnings are positive, or divided by 0.06*total assets if the earnings are negative. We replace the payout ratios of less than zero (greater than one) with a value of zero (one). Beyond year + 5, the residual income is assumed to grow at an expected inflation rate , where is set equal to the current 10-year risk-free rate minus 3%.
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) where the equation has an explicit 12-year forecast horizon, denotes the implied cost of capital estimates that solve GLS's residual income valuation equation, is the market price of a firm's stock at time , and (̂+ − • + −1 ) is the residual income in year + (or for period ( + − 1, + ) ), defined as the difference between forecasted earnings and a cost of capital charged for the book value of equity at the beginning of a fiscal year. ̂+ is the expected future earnings per share for period ( + − 1, + ). The one-and two-year-ahead expected earnings, ̂+ 1 and ̂+ 2 are obtained directly from median analyst earnings forecasts. The three-year-ahead expected earnings, ̂+ 3 , are calculated by projecting the forecasted long-term growth rate, , on the second year's earnings forecast: ̂+ 3 =̂+ 2 • (1 + ) . After year + 3 , expected earnings are forecasted by mean reverting +3 to the industry median ROE, where + denotes the forecasted return on equity in year + , and is constructed as:
+ =̂+ / + −1 . For each industry with the same twodigit SIC code, we compute the median ROE using all the profitable firms in the past 10 years. is the book value of equity per share at the beginning of the fiscal period . + is the expected future book value per share at time + , and is determined by clean surplus accounting: + = + −1 +̂+ • (1 − ), where represents the dividend payout ratio that has the same definition as in the previous model. Beyond year + 12, the residual income is assumed to remain constant as ̂+ 12 − • +11 .
Ohlson and JuettnerNauroth (2005) where denotes the implied cost of capital estimates that solve a special case of OJ's abnormal earnings growth valuation equation as implemented by Gode and Mohanram (2003) , is the market price of a firm's stock at time , ̂+ 1 is the median analyst forecasts on one-year-ahead forecasted earnings per share, ̂+ 1 is the expected dividends per share in year + 1, and is computed as ̂+ 1 =̂+ 1 • , where is the current dividend payout ratio that has the same definition as in the previous models. is the short-term growth rate and is estimated as the average of forecasted near-term growth rate from year + 1 to + 2, (̂+ 2 −̂+ 1 )/̂+ 1 , and the forecasted long-term growth rate, . Beyond year + 1, abnormal earnings are assumed to grow perpetually at rate , where is equal to the current 10-year risk-free rate minus 3%.
Easton (2004) where denotes the implied cost of capital estimates that solve a special case of OJ's abnormal earnings growth valuation equation, is the market price of a firm's stock at time , ̂+ 1 and ̂+ 2 are the median analysts forecasts on one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings per share, ̂+ 1 is the expected dividends per share in year + 1, and is computed as ̂+ 1 =̂+ 1 • , where is the current dividend payout ratio that has the same definition as in the previous models. After the initial period, the abnormal earnings growth is assumed to persist in perpetuity, where the growth rate is determined by ̂+ 1 , ̂+ 2 , and ̂+ 1 . , is the change of total revenues from year − 1 to year ; and , represents the net value of property, plant, and equipment. All variables are scaled by the total book value of assets at the beginning of a fiscal year, , −1 . We estimate the model for each industry-year (j, t) group with more than 10 observations, where industry is defined at the three-digit SIC level. Then we use the absolute value of the residual, , , as the measure of earnings management.
Calculated by the authors, Compustat
DAccrual _Modified Jones
The absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) (1), (4) and (7), the natural logarithm of R AVG _R f , Ln(R AVG _R f ), in columns (2) and (5), and the first principal component of the four individual ICOC, R FPC _R f , in columns (3) and (6). Columns (1) -(6) employ the ordinary least squares, while column (7) applies the weighted OLS regression with one plus the log of analyst forecast accuracy as the weights, where the forecast accuracy is defined as the inverse of the absolute one-year-ahead analyst forecast error. We control for several observable firm characteristics in columns (4) - (7). Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to the market value of equity. BM equals to the natural logarithm of book value of equity to the market value of equity. These three variables are all lagged one year compared to the dependent variable. Market beta, Beta, is estimated by the market model using previous 12-month daily returns. IdiosRisk equals to the standard deviation of the residual daily returns in the market model. LnRet12 is the natural logarithm of one plus the compounded stock returns during the previous 12 months. Finally, FBIAS is the difference between actual EPS and analyst forecasted EPS, scaled by the stock price 30 days before the forecast announcement date. The actual EPS is obtained from IBES if available, and Compustat otherwise. All the model specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and calculated using standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** represent significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) adds industry-year fixed effects where the industry classification is the 2-digit SIC code. Column (3) controls for both state-year and industry-year dummies. Columns (4) -(6) consider the potential confounding event, the passage of Antitakeover laws. In particular, column (4) controls for a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is incorporated in a state that has passed a Business Combination law. Similarly, columns (5) and (6) control for Fair Price and Control Share Statutes. Column (7) adds other governance controls, firm-level anti-takeover provisions (G-index) and industry-level product market competition (Herfindahl-Hirschman index, or HHI). Firm-level controls include the same set of variables as in the previous table, namely Size, Leverage, BM, Beta, IdiosRisk, LnRet12, and FBIAS. All the model specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust tstatistics are reported in parenthesis and calculated using standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** represent significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (4) in Table 4 . Column (2) removes those firms that are incorporated in the state of Delaware. Column (3) drops the years of 2000 and 2001, identified as the internet bubble periods. Column (4) extends the sample period beyond 2007 until 2013. Column (5) restrict to only the 23 states that have passed the UD law within the sample period. Firm-level control includes the same set of variables as in the previous table, namely Size, Leverage, BM, Beta, IdiosRisk, LnRet12, and FBIAS. All the model specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and calculated using standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** represent significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline in Table 4 Remove Delaware In particular, we add into the baseline regression an interaction term between the UD Law dummy and a measure of industrial M&A intensity. We use two measures of M&A intensity, the total dollar volume of M&A deals in each industry scaled by the Total assets in the same industry, or the Market capitalization in the same industry (calculated using all the public firms in Compustat). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the average of four implied cost of equity measures minus risk free rate, R AVG _R f , and the first principal component, R FPC _R f , in columns (3) and (4). Firm-level controls include the same set of variables as in the previous table, namely Size, Leverage, BM, Beta, IdiosRisk, LnRet12, and FBIAS. Variable definitions are the same as those in the previous tables. All the model specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and calculated using standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** represent significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) 
